Director Notes

Corporate Culture and ERM
by Michelle Harner

The attitudes and actions of those viewed as leaders within a company
(commonly referred to as “tone at the top”) help to deﬁne corporate culture
and are critical to implementing a successful enterprise risk management
(ERM) program. This Director Notes explores the challenges and beneﬁts
of creating a risk-aware corporate culture.
ERM as a Management Tool
Businesses, regardless of industry, are increasingly global,
technology-driven, complex, and sensitive to market
conditions. Boards of directors (boards) and senior
management often are called upon to make critical decisions
in a compressed time frame—decisions that may have a
significant impact on the company, investors, employees,
and the markets. These tasks are particularly challenging for
directors who typically are not involved in the day-to-day
operations of the company and must make decisions based
on reports and data presented solely in the boardroom.1
Those board meetings may not capture the true pulse of the
company or the nuances and breadth of the decisions at hand.2
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In that context, companies are increasingly using enterprise risk management (ERM) as a tool to better inform
decision-making processes.3 ERM is a holistic approach
to risk management that seeks to identify, assess, and
manage known and emerging risks to the company
and its objectives.4 It is grounded in strong channels of
communication across the enterprise: a cross-functional
initiative intended to manage more than financial risks.5
ERM, if properly implemented, can extract and synthesize
relevant information to help boards and senior management
understand more fully the issues and potential roadblocks
to implementation of the company’s overall strategic plan.
Rather than a snapshot, ERM facilitates a more vivid,
robust, and in-depth study of alternative paths to success.
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Boards and senior management play critical roles in ERM.6
Boards oversee the process, determine the company’s risk
appetite, and help manage the company’s risk profile within
those parameters. Boards and senior management also set
the company’s culture, and these leaders are really the only
individuals who can establish a risk-aware environment.
Indeed, “tone at the top” has become in many respects
synonymous with ERM.7

Corporate culture refers to a company’s
core values and objectives, as expressed
through the attitudes and behavior
of the board and senior management.
Although the board alone cannot foster
an effective ERM program, it can set the
tone and exercise its oversight function
in ways that facilitate meaningful risk
management practices. The board is
vital to creating a risk-aware and valuegenerating corporate culture.
Communicating What the Company Values
Commentators frequently invoke “tone at the top” when
discussing ERM. It is more than a catch phrase—the concept
is critical to implementing a successful risk management
program. Tone at the top refers fundamentally to the attitudes
and actions of those individuals viewed as leaders within
a company. As risk management expert Douglas Brooks
writes, “With culture, tone is critical, and the support must be
behavioral as well as simply providing funding or resources.
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It is up to leadership to effectively define the culture of the
organization by encouraging, discouraging, and exhibiting
certain behaviors.”8 Accordingly, responsibility for setting this
tone typically rests with the board and senior management.
Developing the correct tone and creating a risk-aware culture
are difficult tasks. Research suggests, however, that they
are well worth the time and effort because “[a] direct link
exists between a company’s culture and employee behavior.”9
Commentators posit various guidelines to help boards and
senior management change or improve their companies’
culture.10 Although each company must find its own way,
boards and managers who are committed to actively
managing their companies’ risk profiles within the parameters
of carefully evaluated risk appetites, communicating
that commitment to all employees, and adopting policies
and incentive/compensation structures aligned with that
commitment likely are moving in the right direction.

EXAMPLES

Good Tone at the Top, Poor Tone at the Top
Good tone at the top The company has policy statements
and code of conduct which explicitly tell employees how they
should behave in the company. The code of conduct applies
to all employees, including top management. The importance
of ethical behaviour is frequently highlighted by management
through regular staff meetings. Employees are encouraged
to communicate to their supervisors both “good news” and
“bad news”. Good job performance is well recognised. Top
management always rewards appropriate behaviour and
addresses inappropriate behaviour.
Bad tone at the top The company has policy statements and
code of conduct which include general guidance of business
ethics. The code of conduct applies to all employees, though
top management seems not to be bound by the code of
conduct. Employees read the code of conduct on the first
day of their employment and seldom review it afterwards.
The management team is autocratic. Employees are always
afraid of delivering “bad news” to their supervisors. Good job
performance is not always well recognised. Top management
does not seem to care about or reward appropriate behaviour
and address misbehaviour.
Source: Isabel Wang and Neil Fargher, “The Effect of Tone at the Top on Internal
Auditors’ Assessments of the Likelihood of Financial Misstatements,” 2012, p.
28 (cbe.anu.edu.au/media/2429892/wangancaar.pdf).
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A board can show its commitment to value creation through
ethically sound business practices and approved risk-seeking
strategies by, among other things, implementing an ERM
program that clearly defines the company’s risk appetite and
reconciles that level of risk tolerance with the company’s risk
profile and strategic plan.11 The board also needs to clearly
communicate the company’s approved level of risk-seeking
activities to all employees, preferably through a written
statement.12 Commentators suggest that, in drafting a riskappetite statement, boards should ensure that the established
risk appetite:

•
•

directly links to the organization’s objectives;

•

helps with setting acceptable tolerances for risk, thereby
identifying the parameters of acceptable risks (discussed
in the next section);

•

encourages alignment of people, processes, and infrastructure in pursuing organizational objectives within
acceptable ranges of risk;

•

keeps track of the competitive environment and considers
shareholders’ views in identifying the need to reassess or
more fully communicate the risk appetite;

•

recognizes that risk is temporal and relates to the time frame
of the objectives being pursued; and

•

recognizes that the organization has a portfolio of projects and
objectives, as well as a portfolio of risks to manage, implying
that risk appetite has meaning at the individual objective level
and at the portfolio level.13

is stated precisely enough that it can be communicated
throughout the organization, effectively monitored, and
adjusted over time;

A company should also consider its risk appetite in designing
its incentive and compensation structure. Some suggest
that, “aligning executive compensation with the company’s
long-range objectives should limit executives’ incentive[s] to
make decisions that improve short-term metrics but increase
the company’s risk exposure.”14 Adopting such an approach
requires the board to consider what the company wants to
value and reward through its incentive and compensation
plans. Those objectives should complement and strengthen
the board’s efforts to establish the company’s risk appetite
and create a risk-aware culture.
To achieve this alignment, commentators suggest using
nonfinancial metrics, such as product quality and customer
satisfaction, in setting incentives and compensation.15
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Integrating clawback provisions and linking stock option
awards, at least in part, to nonfinancial metrics may also
further the company’s objectives.16 Admittedly, striking the
appropriate balance in what at times might appear to be
the conflicting objectives of value maximization and risk
awareness can be challenging. Boards should remember,
however, that this apparent conflict dissipates significantly
if the company is working to align long-term value creation
and risk minimization (or at least amelioration).

The Importance of “Walking the Talk”
As suggested above, a board decision to implement ERM
and discuss risk awareness is not enough; the board also
must “walk the talk.”17 The behavior of the board and
senior management must reflect the values pronounced in
the risk-appetite statement and the internal and external
communications regarding the ERM program.18 Although
the production of these materials is an important initial
step, the board and senior management must also be vested
in the ERM process and open to the resulting flow of
information. Asking employees to care about and prudently
manage risk but not listening to or providing appropriate
support for those risk-related discussions does little to foster
a risk-aware culture.
Failure to listen and respond to risk-related concerns—
whether generated through an ERM program or otherwise—
also might expose the company to financial, operational, or
reputational damage and the board to litigation and potential
liability. For example, consider the significant trading losses
sustained by JPMorgan Chase in the spring of 2012. Following
a New York Times report that JPMorgan’s trading loss from
a bet on credit derivatives would far exceed earlier estimates
and could total as much as $9 billion,19 JPMorgan’s stock
price dipped 2.5 percent.20 Moreover, reports suggested that
“top investment bank executives raised concerns about the
growing size and complexity of bets held by the bank’s chief
investment office as early as 2007.”21 Investors predictably
filed lawsuits against JPMorgan’s board and management
to recoup the losses.22
This pattern is common—a company suffers losses from
a risk event, investors or regulators allege that the board
knew or had reason to know (i.e., red flags) of the risk
and failed to address it, and litigation ensues.23 Many
companies, including AIG, Citigroup, Lehman Brothers,
Worldcom, and Enron, have, faced such allegations.24
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In fact, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations in its investigation of the Enron collapse
concluded that: “By failing to provide sufficient oversight
and restraint to stop management excess, the Enron Board
contributed to the company’s collapse and bears a share of
the responsibility for it.”25
Some commentators suggest that red-flag allegations
against boards are overused and often meritless. Michael
Peregrine, for one, says, “Certainly, some of the cases
involve instances where better oversight could have
minimized some of the damage, [b]ut this allegorical love
affair with ‘red flag’ references is harmful.”26 Regardless
of whether these commentators are correct or whether the
board ultimately shows it has satisfied its fiduciary duties
(discussed below), litigation is expensive, time consuming,
and may harm the company’s and the board’s reputations.
Accordingly, boards should ensure that their companies
adopt and implement risk management programs that not
only identify risks but also provide an effective process for
the communication and consideration of risks. ERM offers
a workable framework to help boards mitigate red-flag
allegations and, perhaps more importantly, address any
flags that pose real risk to the company or its objectives.
Of course, risk management should not drive all board
or management decisions. Businesses are inherently
entrepreneurial and, hence, involve the assumption of
acceptable levels of risk. ERM, properly implemented,
presents the opportunity for companies to consider and
actively manage the “downside,” thereby setting the tone
for profit maximization without taking imprudent risks.
Advance consideration of those risks is always preferable to
crisis-driven reactions to emerging events that might have
been anticipated earlier.

The Importance of the Board’s Role from
a Legal Perspective
The board, acting as a fiduciary for the company and
its shareholders, owes certain fiduciary duties. 27 These
generally include the duties of care and loyalty, but also more
specific duties or obligations, such as good faith, disclosure,
and oversight.28 Although several fiduciary duties may be
implicated, allegations of lax risk management typically
invoke the board’s oversight duty, also referred to as the
duty to monitor.29

4
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Courts generally defer to the board’s business judgment on
matters concerning the company, including the structure
and substance of the company’s compliance and monitoring
programs.30 As such, courts typically protect boards against
oversight liability if a reasonable monitoring or reporting
system is in place.31 Courts commonly articulate this standard
as imposing liability only for “sustained or systemic failure
of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure
to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exists.”32
Courts have offered guidance on the types of conduct that
might satisfy this standard. For example, evidence that the
board knowingly disregarded risks or intentionally failed to
monitor or oversee the company’s operations might suffice.33
The critical element for most courts appears to be scienter,
or evidence of the board’s knowledge or intent.34 Plaintiffs
have tried to prove scienter through evidence of red flags—
issues raised but overlooked or ignored by the board. The
particularized allegations and the types of alleged wrongful
conduct needed to survive a motion to dismiss in duty to
monitor litigation are found in American International Group
v. Greenberg, Louisiana Municipal Police v. Pyott, and In re
Puda Coal, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.35
In the AIG case, a group of shareholders filed a derivative
lawsuit on behalf of the company alleging wrongdoing by
the chairman of the board, other directors and executive
officers, certain other personnel, and the company’s
accounting firm. The allegations included the intentional
making of materially misleading financial statements,
overstating the value of the corporation by billions of
dollars, and engaging in conspiracies with competitors
to rig the municipal derivative and general insurance
markets.36 More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the
CEO and his “inner circle”—a small group of long-time
executives who received lucrative compensation packages
that were characterized as “rewards” from the CEO—
directed widespread illegal conduct.37
In the Pyott case, a shareholder brought a derivative
action against individual directors of a pharmaceutical
corporation after the company pled guilty to criminal
misdemeanor misbranding and paid civil and criminal
fines.38 Notably, the court refused to grant a motion to
dismiss, even after acknowledging the burden of proof to
be high, because the board of directors had “discussed and
approved a series of annual strategic plans” premised on
illegal activity for at least a four-year period.39
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Finally, in the Puda Coal case, Chancellor Strine of the
Delaware Chancery Court denied a motion to dismiss
breach of fiduciary duty claims against independent
directors where the directors allegedly did not know about
unauthorized transfers of corporate assets in China.40
Chancellor Strine explained, “[I]f you’re going to have
a company domiciled for purposes of its relations with
its investors in Delaware and the assets and operations
of that company are situated in China that, in order for
you to meet your obligation of good faith, you better
have your physical body in China an awful lot.”41 As one
commentator noted, “[the case] is a useful reminder to
board members of Delaware corporations who need to be
especially concerned about how they fulfill their oversight
duties when the corporate operations or assets may be
located in far-flung countries.”42
Despite the AIG, Pyott, and Puda Coal cases, it remains
difficult to establish breaches of a board’s duty to monitor,
particularly in the context of business risks.43 The honest
and diligent board that has implemented a reasonable
risk management or oversight program should garner
protection.44 That program further should include clear
processes for the investigation and handling of risks
identified or reported through the program. The more
systematic the approach, the less likely that red-flag
allegations will emerge or be entertained by the courts.

The Importance of the Board’s Role from an
ERM Perspective

Chart 2
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This percentage was much higher for larger organizations,
public companies, and financial services firms—80.7 percent,
82 percent, and 71.5 percent, respectively.48 Similar trends
were identified in questions concerning reports of the
company’s top risks to the board and the integration of risk
discussions with strategic planning. Approximately half of all
respondents indicated a practice of producing such reports
for the board on an annual basis and engaging in integrated
discussions, but these percentages were, once again, much
higher for larger organizations, public companies, and
financial services firms.49

The board’s oversight duty should guide its role in ERM. The
board cannot, and should not, be responsible for managing
all risks or implementing all aspects of the ERM program.
Rather, the board should take an institutional- or entitylevel role in the program. For example, the board should
participate in the design and rollout of the ERM program,
take the lead in cultivating a risk-aware culture, set the
company’s risk appetite, and align that with the company’s
risk profile. Moreover, the board should remain involved in
evaluating the company’s strategic risks, and monitor the
implementation and functioning of the overall program.45

The board should not try to micro-manage the ERM
program. That type of oversight and responsibility should rest
with management and risk owners at the unit, department,
or other appropriate levels throughout the organization.
However, a board can, take the following steps to enhance
the company’s ERM program and ultimate performance.50

According to an ERM survey published in July 2012,46 “only
45.9 percent of the respondents in the full sample [over 600
executives] indicated that their boards have formally assigned
risk oversight responsibility to a board committee.”47

Develop risk appetite Develop the company’s risk appetite
(and related risk-appetite statement) and work with management and the appropriate professionals to set metrics
to monitor the alignment of that risk appetite with the
company’s risk profile.
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Understand risks Work with management to understand
the company’s risk profile, where the company’s critical
risks are situated throughout the entity structure, and how
those risks are interrelated.
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Set clear expectations Establish clear expectations concerning risk management with management, risk owners,
and others involved in the implementation and monitoring
of the ERM program, and underscore those expectations in
structuring incentives and compensation.
Know the plan Review management’s plans for implementing,
monitoring, and communicating the ERM program and the
company’s risk appetite throughout the company, ensuring
well-defined channels of communication, expectations
concerning risk management, and the consequences of
actions exceeding the company’s risk appetite.
Obtain information Require periodic reports from
management, risk owners, and others involved in the
implementation and monitoring of the ERM program
on the status of the program and the entity-level risks
requiring board consideration and action.
Take action Integrate risk discussions with strategic
planning and ensure that the company’s primary business
objectives are communicated effectively throughout the
company to facilitate similar integration at all levels of
risk management.51
Notably, the survey referenced above found that only
37.1 percent of respondents attempted to integrate risk
discussions with strategic planning and, in turn, consider
“emerging strategic, market, or industry risks.” 52 Yet this step
of the ERM process is essential to long-term sustainability
and value creation. Boards should encourage their companies to consider not only the risks they face today, but
also those that might impede their progress tomorrow
by embracing such an approach in their consideration of
entity-level risks. Being vested in the process and leading by
example can help boards cultivate a risk-aware culture and
a meaningful ERM program.

6
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Boards Play a Critical and Positive Role
in ERM
An effective ERM program requires buy-in at all levels of
the company, but that process starts with the board and
senior management. The attitudes and behavior of the
board and senior management (tone at the top) can trigger
a positive (or negative) chain reaction throughout the
company regarding risk management practices and their
relationship to the company’s strategic objectives.
Boards considering reasons to implement ERM should
examine the growing data suggesting a correlation between
mature risk management practices and value creation, as
well as the increasing scrutiny of risk management practices
by courts and regulators.53 In addition, implementing a
process that fosters better information and communication
concerning potential barriers to the company’s strategic
objectives is simply good management. Many organizations
and investors are urging companies to adopt ERM as
best practice,54 and as ERM processes continue to evolve,
companies appear to be embracing this recommendation.55
Accordingly, boards should take the time to understand
ERM and its potential application to their companies. They
also should appreciate that any ERM program will be only
as successful as their involvement signals it should be. Tone
at the top is more than a catch phrase; it is the genesis of a
company’s culture and, consequently, necessary to establish
a risk-aware and value-generating corporate environment.
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derivative action on behalf of Aon Corp. was due to failure to supervise in
the face of repeated “red flags”).
25 U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, The Role of the Board of Directors in
Enron’s Collapse (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002) p. 59.
26 Michael W. Peregrine, “Seeing Red Flags Where None Exist,” New
York Times Dealbook, June 14, 2012 (http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2012/06/14/seeing-red-flags-where-none-exist/?_r=0).
27 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d
92 (Del. 2007); and Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170
N.W. 668, 684 (1919); Model Business Corporation Act Annotated §
8.01(b) (4th ed. 2008). Directors also may owe duties to the company’s
creditors in certain circumstances depending on the company’s financial
condition. See, for example, Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101-103.
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28 Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70
(Del. 2006).
29 Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70. Risk management may already be highly
relevant to the board’s duty to monitor due to the changing regulatory
environment. See Michelle M. Harner, “Barrier to Effective Risk
Management,” Seton Hall Law Review 40, issue 4, 2010, pp. 1323, 1330–
1331 (discussing regulatory requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley and the New
York Stock Exchange).
30 See, for example, Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting,
in the context of demand futility, a presumption that directors making
business decisions act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the
honest belief the action was taken in good faith; the party challenging the
decision carries the burden of rebutting the presumption). See also In re
Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009).
(“To impose oversight liability on the directors for failure to monitor
‘excessive’ risk would involve courts in conducting hindsight evaluations
of decisions at the heart of the business judgment of directors.”)
31 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 971; ATM-Kim
Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, Civ. No. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520 at *19-21
(Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006), aff’d 930 A.2d 928 (Del. 2007) (finding two
members of the board breached of duty to monitor the disloyal and
fraudulent conduct of another board member).
32 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
33 See, e.g., Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70. (“Caremark articulates the
necessary conditions predicate for director oversight liability: (a) the
directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system
or controls, or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously
failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves
from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”) See
also Donald A. Corbett and Daniel Roque, “Losses, but No Liability, for the
Failure to Monitor Business Risk,” Inside, New York State Bar Association,
27, no. 3, Winter 2009, p. 9.
34 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 125, 123, fn. 47; Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125;
Goldman, No. C.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104 at *20 (Oct. 12, 2011);
and Brenner v. Albrecht, No. C.A. 6514-VCP, 2012 WL 252286 at *5 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 27, 2012).
35 Am. Int’l Group v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009), aff’d 11
A.3d 228 (Del. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss, among other things,
plaintiffs duty to monitor claims; notably, the court in Citigroup, 964 A.2d
at 130, distinguished this case as one alleging a failure to monitor legal
or compliance risks as opposed to business risks); La. Mun. Police Empls
Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012) (denying motion to dismiss,
among other things, duty to monitor claims); and In re Puda Coal, Inc.
Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 6476-CS (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013) (bench
ruling) (denying motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims against
independent directors in case involving oversight of assets in foreign
jurisdictions). See also In re Am. Int’l Group, Inc. ERISA Litig. II, No. 08
Civ. 5722, 2011 WL 1226459 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (denying motion to
dismiss, among other things, allegations concerning failure to monitor
certain fiduciaries).
36 Greenberg, 965 A.2d at 774-75.
37 Greenberg, 965 A.2d at 774-75.
38 Pyott, 46 A.3d at 317-21.
39 Pyott, 46 A.3d at 42, 352-53.
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Endnotes (continued)
40 In re Puda Coal, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 6476-CS
(Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013) (bench ruling), transcript available at www.
delawarelitigation.com/files/2013/02/puda-case.pdf (last visited
May 6, 2013). See also Kevin LaCroix, “Delaware Chancery Court:
A Sweeping Revision of Outside Directors’ Foreign Operations
Oversight Responsibilities?” D&O Diary Blog, February 27, 2013 (www.
dandodiary.com/2013/02/articles/shareholders-derivative-litiga/
delaware-chancery-court-a-sweeping-vision-of-outside-directorsforeign-operations-oversight-responsibilities); and Tariq Mundiya,
“Independent Director Duties of Delaware Corporations with Foreign
Operations,” Harvard Law Blog, February 23, 2013 (blogs.law.harvard.
edu/corpgov/2013/02/23/independent-director-duties-of-delawarecorporations-with-foreign-operations). For background on underlying
investigation, see Joshua Gallu and Karen Gullo, “Puda Coal Executives
Stole Company Assets, SEC Alleges in Suit,” Bloomberg News, February
24, 2012 (www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-24/puda-coalexecutives-stole-company-assets-sec-alleges-in-suit.html).
41 In re Puda Coal, Inc. C.A. No. 6476-CS (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013).
42 Francis Pileggi, “Delaware Board’s Fiduciary Duty of Oversight for Foreign
Operations,” Delaware Corporate & Commercial Litigation Blog, February
19, 2013 (www.delawarelitigation.com/2013/02/articles/chancerycourt-updates/fiduciary-duty-of-oversight-for-foreign-operations-of-uscompany).
43 Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125 (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967) (“[d]irector
liability based on the duty of oversight ‘is possibly the most difficult
theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a
judgment’”).
44 See, for example, Stone, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (“[d]irectors’ good faith
exercise of oversight responsibility may not invariably prevent employees
from violating criminal laws, or from causing the corporation to incur
significant financial liability, or both”).
45 See, for example, PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Extending Enterprise Risk
Management,” p. 25 (“To improve their risk resilience, organisations
are challenged to revisit, innovate, and refine [their ERM programs]… to
ensure that… [a]ssessment of these risks occurs periodically, …[r]isk
responses are determined or revised as necessary…[, and] [a]dequate
monitoring mechanisms are developed and tracked routinely.”); and
Rittenberg and Martens, “Enterprise Risk Management,” p. 2. (“Once
risk appetite is communicated, management, with board support,
needs to revisit and reinforce it. Risk appetite cannot be set once and
then left alone.”)
46 Beasley, Branson, and Hancock, “Current State of Enterprise Risk
Oversight.”
47 Beasley, Branson, and Hancock, “Current State of Enterprise Risk
Oversight,” p. 25.
48 Beasley, Branson, and Hancock, “Current State of Enterprise Risk
Oversight.”
49 Beasley, Branson and Hancock, “Current State of Enterprise Risk
Oversight,” p. 26.
50 Lipton, et al., “Risk Management and the Board,” pp. 796-797. (Other
appropriate considerations include, reviewing the steps taken by
management to ensure adequate independence of the risk management
function and the processes for resolution and escalation of differences
that might arise between risk management and business functions,
reviewing with management the design of the program to include
discussions of potential coverage gaps or issues with lines or reporting;
and reviewing the qualifications and background of senior risk officers
and personnel policies applicable to risk management.)
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51 Lipton, et al., “Risk Management and the Board,” 794 (noting risk
management should be viewed as “an integral component of the firm’s
corporate strategy, culture and business operations”); Leech, “Board
Oversight of Management’s Risk Appetite,” pp. 4, 6 (discussing how
many organizations fail to identify predictable or expected risks that
may affect their strategic plan); COSO Report, p. 3 (“Achievement of
strategic objectives and operations objectives, however, is subject to
external events not always within the entity’s control; accordingly, for
these objectives, enterprise risk management can provide reasonable
assurance that management, and the board in its oversight role, are made
aware, in a timely manner, of the extent to which the entity is moving
toward achievement of the objectives.”); and Association of Insurance
and Risk Managers, et al., “A Structured Approach to Enterprise Risk
Management (ERM) and the Requirements of ISO 31000,” p. 6 (“Risk
management must be integrated into the culture of the organisation and
this will include mandate, leadership and commitment from the Board. It
must translate risk strategy into tactical and operational objectives, and
assign risk management responsibilities throughout the organisation.”).
52 Beasley, Branson, and Hancock, “Current State of Enterprise Risk
Oversight,” p. 4. (“Less than one-third [of survey respondents] have
‘mostly’ or ‘exclusively articulated the organization’s appetite for or
tolerance of risks in the context of strategic planning. Just over 15 percent
believe ‘mostly’ or ‘extensively’ that the organization’s risk management
process is a proprietary strategic tool that provides unique competitive
advantage.”)
53 See, for example, Gates, Nicolas, and Walker, “Enterprise Risk
Management,” pp. 28–29 (discussing how ERM is useful in the face of
regulatory pressures and also creates value); Leech, “Board Oversight
of Management’s Risk Appetite,” p. 2 (noting that ERM is implicated in
multiple regulatory regimes and creates shareholder value); and Lipton,
et al., “Risk Management and the Board,” (discussing ERM as a means of
fulfilling director duties in the face of the regulatory climate).
54 Leech, “Board Oversight of Management’s Risk Appetite,” pp. 2–3
(discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as well as recommendations
by the SEC, the National Association of Corporate Directors, the
International Corporate Governance Network, the Canadian Institute
of Chartered Accountants, and the Institute for Internal Auditors);
PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Extending Enterprise Risk Management,”
p. 3 (discussing the ERM standard laid out by Standard & Poor’s and
also the ERM recommendations of the United States’ “Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.”); and Michael
Alix, Senior Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Risk Governance: Appetite, Culture and the Limits of Limits, Remarks at
the Risk USA 2012 Conference , November 14, 2012 (www.newyorkfed.
org/newsevents/speeches/2012/alix121114.html) (describing how the
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group and the “Senior Supervisors
Group” have called for improvements in risk governance and financial
firms).
55 Beasley, Branson, and Hancock, “Current State of Enterprise Risk
Oversight,” p. 9 (indicating there has been a steady increase in the
number of organizations embracing ERM over time and noting that for
the full sample of respondents, the percentage has increased from 8.8
percent in 2009 to 23.4 percent in 2012).
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